Arbitration, Statute of Limitations, and Uninsured Motorist Endorsements by Hudak, Leona M.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1970
Arbitration, Statute of Limitations, and Uninsured
Motorist Endorsements
Leona M. Hudak
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Insurance Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leona M. Hudak, Arbitration, Statute of Limitations, and Uninsured Motorist Endorsements, 19 Clev. St. L. Rev. 528 (1970)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol19/iss3/14
Arbitration, Statute of Limitations, and
Uninsured Motorist Endorsements
Leona M. Hudak*
D EATH OR PERSONAL INJURY by means of the automobile is an ubiqui-
tous threat to modern man's daily existence. An even more dread-
ed menace is the financially irresponsible motorist. To help alleviate the
economic plight of his remediless victim(s), the National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau in De-
cember, 1956, first promulgated uninsured motorist coverage, as an en-
dorsement to their standard family automobile policy.'
This standard-form uninsured motorist endorsement now exists by
statutory mandate in some 45 states. 2 Two sections of it generally deal
with arbitration.3 The first-typically found under the heading "Pro-
tection against Uninsured Motorist" 4-provides:
The company will pay all sums which the insured or his legal
representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from
the owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle because of
bodily injury sustained by the insured, caused by accident and aris-
ing out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured high-
way vehicle; provided, for the purposes of this coverage, determi-
nation as to whether the insured or such representative is legally en-
titled to recover such damages, and if so the amount thereof, shall
be made by agreement between the insured or such representative
and the company or, if they fail to agree, by arbitration. 5
The second section pertaining to arbitration, generally found under the
heading "Conditions," reads:
Arbitration. If any person making claim hereunder and the
company do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover
damages from the owner or operator of an insured highway vehicle
* BA. Case Western Reserve University; MA., M.A.L.S., University of Wisconsin;
Third-year student, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
1 Plummer, Handling Claims Under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 1957 Ins. L. J.
494; Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. U. L. R. 497, 499
(1967). This insurance protection is commonly termed the "uninsured motorist en-
dorsement." Plummer, The Uncompensated Accident Victim, 24 Ins. L. J. 78 (1957).
2 See Aksen, Arbitration of Automobile Accident Cases, 1 Conn. L. Rev. 70, 90 (1968)
for a complete list. The applicable Ohio law is found in Ohio Rev. Code § 2711.01-16.
3 Aksen, supra, n. 2 at n. 28. The insurance law of each state determines whether or
not arbitration will be used to resolve disputes arising under this endorsement. Some
jurisdictions prohibit the inclusion of arbitration clauses in the endorsement, on the
ground that arbitration unconstitutionally denies claimants a jury trial. The major-
ity of states have no provision affecting arbitration. A few provide for arbitration, by
statute. McKinney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 6 Ohio App. 2d 136, 216 N.E. 2d 887 (1966),
held that uninsured-motorist arbitrations in Ohio are statutory in nature.
4 See Travelers Indemnity Co., Personal Automobile Policy, Part II, at 4.
5 Id.
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because of bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree as to the
amount of payment which may be owing under this Part, then, upon
written demand of either, the matter or matters upon which such
person and the company do not agree shall be settled by arbitration
in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, or such other method as may be agreed upon by the parties,
and judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrators may be
entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. Such person and
the company each agree to consider itself bound and to be bound by
Arbitration is begun by serving a written demand therefor upon the
insurer, delineating the claim and the amount of damages sought for per-
sonal injury. Three copies must be filed with any regional office of the
AAA, together with a copy of the insurance policy and the administra-
tive fee of $50. 7 The insurer is then automatically billed a surcharge of
$100 by AAA. A discussion of the procedures employed in arbitrating
an accident claims case is contained in the Association's pamphlet, "Acci-
dent Claims Rules." 8 Arbiters serve without fee in this type of cause.
Their awards are not accompanied by opinions, nor are they published.
Although the wording of arbitration provisions in uninsured motor-
ist endorsements of automobile policies is uniform, courts have not
agreed on issues which the arbitrators may decide. Three judicial inter-
pretations exist regarding their scope: some limit the arbiter's role to
a determination of fault and damages. Here the uninsured status of the
tortfeasor must be established as a condition precedent to arbitration;
some permit arbitrators to resolve all issues arising under the endorse-
ment; others have not yet resolved the intent underlying arbitration in
the clauses.9
At common law, arbitration awards could only be reviewed by a
court of competent jurisdiction, on a showing of fraud or some type of
wilful misconduct by the arbiter. Modern arbitration laws now provide
for review and judicial vacatur, variably, upon grounds of mistake of
law or fact; excess of arbitral power; inadequate or excessive awards;
failure by the arbiter to disclose a relationship, partiality, or prejudice;
failure to grant general damages; and ex parte arbitration.'0
Arbitration under the uninsured motorist endorsement represents
the most prolific source of cases decided presently by the American Ar-
bitration Association. It affords the aggrieved party a speedy and com-
paratively economical legal proceeding.
6 Id. at 7-8.
7 Amer. Arbit. Assoc. Accident Claims Rules. § 4, 6. Effective Jan. 1, 1970.
8 A copy may be procured gratis from the Amer. Arbit. Assoc., 140 West 51st St.,
New York, New York 10020, or from any Regional AAA office.
9 Aksen, Judicial Review of Uninsured-Motorist Arbitration Awards, 48 Ore. L. R.
74, 76-77 (1968).
10 Id. at 81-91.
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Applicable Statute of Limitations
In writing up their uninsured motorist endorsements in personal
automobile insurance policies, the insurers placed no time limits within
which the insured had to file his claim. Apparently they intended the
statute of limitations of each jurisdiction to prevail. In states where the
statutes providing for uninsured motorist coverage are silent on time
limits within which claims based upon such coverage must be brought,
the issue soon arose as to whether the policyholder's right of action was
in tort or in contract, the latter usually being considerably longer."
Insurance companies argued that the tort statute of limitations applied,
sustaining their position on the dual rationale that: (1) the insured's
claim for personal injuries is bottomed on negligence; and if he allows
the tort statute to run, he no longer has a valid claim under the endorse-
ment in question, which allows recovery only for sums that the insured
is legally entitled to recover; 12 and, (2) if the insured permits the shorter
negligence statute of limitations to lapse against the uninsured motorist,
the insurer may be precluded from any subrogation rights it has under
the policy.12a
Courts soon revealed themselves as favoring the longer period-for
reasons which follow in the ensuing analysis.
Common Law Decisions
Ceccarelli v. Travelers Indemnity Co. 13 appears to be the first re-
ported case squarely on the issue. The accident in dispute occurred on
March 14, 1956. The injured plaintiff made no demand for arbitration
until May 28, 1959. Justice McDonald overruled defendant insurer's
motion to deny arbitration, predicated on the ground that the cause of
action was barred by the 3-year negligence statute of limitations. Citing
no authority, he concluded:
Petitioner's claim against the respondent is based not upon the
insurance contract, although a tortious act of a third party gives rise
11 In Ohio the statute of limitations on written contract actions is 15 years; Ohio
Rev. Code § 2305.6; on negligence, 2 years; Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10.
12 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. spearheaded this position with its
Questions and Answers on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Divisional Claims Super-
intendents' Conference, Feb. 17-19, 1960, Panel Discussion on Uninsured Motorist
Coverage. Comment, 48 Calif. L. R. 516, 531-32 (1960); Notes, 14 U. Fla. L. R. 455,
471-2 (1962); Aksen, Arbitration of Uninsured Motorist Endorsement Claims, 24 Ohio
St. L. J. 589, 591-2 (1963); Schulz v. Allstate, 17 Ohio Misc. 83, 244 N.E. 2d 546 (Com.
P1., Franklin Co., 1968). This argument was rejected in Ceccarelli v. Travelers In-
demnity Co., 204 N.Y.S. 2d 550 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co., 1960).
12a See, Security Ins. Co. v. Rogers, N.Y. L. J., Oct. 4, 1960, at 14/2. Aksen, supra,
n. 8, at 592, citing Notes, 14 U. Fla. L. R. 471-2; Comment, 48 Calif. L. R. 531-2;
Schulz v. Allstate, supra, n. 8, at 87-88.
13 Supra, n. 12.
Sept. 1970
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to the rights under the contract. The claim being made in contract,
the three-year Statute of Limitations is not applicable.14
Two years later, the same court heard the same defendant-Travel-
ers Indemnity Company-plead for a stay of an arbitration demand com-
menced by a policyholder. 15 The Company alleged estoppel for failure
by the insured to comply with a condition precedent-viz., not instituting
an action against the tortfeasor before expiration of the tort statute of
limitations, in order to protect the Company's rights as subrogee under
a trust arrangement contained in the policy. Mr. and Mrs. DuBose sus-
tained their injuries on January 10, 1958. They filed claims with the Com-
pany on November 25, 1959 and July 8, 1960, and were subsequently ad-
vised that their file had been lost. After the Company refused to pay on
a submission of proof of claim forms, respondents served it, on August
11, 1961, with their written demand for arbitration.
Justice Ventiera, describing the Company's arguments as a "novel-
ty," rejected its motion for a stay and ordered arbitration-after finding
that the respondents had "strictly followed the procedure outlined in the
contract," and that petitioner had "failed to show that they did not com-
ply with the conditions of the contract." 16 As in Ceccarelli, the tort stat-
ute of limitations was held inapplicable. 17
Three months after the DeBose decision by the King's County (New
York) Supreme Court, the Queens County Supreme Court rendered
a similar judgment in LaMarsh v. Maryland Casualty Co.'8
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Holbert,19 the insurer
also sought an order restraining arbitration demanded by the insured
husband and wife. The issue was whether or not the two questions
raised by the petitioner-viz., timely notice by the defendants to the
Company of the hit-and-run accident and the statute of limitations-
could be decided by the court or should be left for determination by the
arbitrators.20 Justice Brink, citing several authorities,2 1 held "that a dis-
pute relating to a claimant's having given timely notice bears on whether
he is legally entitled to recover from the petitioner under the endorse-
14 Id. at 552.
15 Travelers Indemnity Co. v. DeBase, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 16 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co., 1962),
28 A.L.R. 3d 580, decided March 14, 1962.
16 Id. at 19-21.
17 Id. at 18.
18 35 Misc. 2d 641, 231 N.Y.S. 2d 121 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co., 1962), 28 A.L.R. 3d 580.
The same issue was again tried and identically decided in Fitzpatrick v. MVAIC, 40
Misc. 2d 970, 244 N.Y.S. 2d 154 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co., 1963), decided October 1, 1963.
19 19 A.D. 2d 683, 241 N.Y.S. 2d 1021 (3d Dept.), affg. 39 Misc. 2d 782, 241 N.Y.S. 2d
589 (Sup. Ct., Broome Co., 1962), 28 A.L.R. 580, decided September 21, 1962.
20 Id. at 591.
21 MVAIC v. Brown, 15 A.D. 2d 578, 579, 223 N.Y.S. 2d 309, 311 (Case No. 14) (2d
Dept. 1961); Granese v. MVAIC, 26 Misc. 2d 646, 206 N.Y.S. 2d 292 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
Co., 1960); Rosenbaum v. American Surety Co. of New York, 11 N.Y. 2d 310, 229
N.Y.S. 2d 375, 183 N.E. 2d 667 (1962).
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ment and not whether he is legally entitled to recover from the owner or
operator of the uninsured automobile." Thus, that issue did not fall with-
in the scope of the arbitration clause and was not proper for submission
to the arbitrators over the objection of the petitioner, but was rather
a factual question to be determined by a court hearing.22 As to the ap-
plicable statute of limitations, the 6-year contract period was held proper
in the insureds' action against the insurer; but the insureds' negligence
action against the hit-and-skip driver tolled the 3-year tort statute of
limitations during the interim that he concealed his identity.
23
Aware that its compulsory insurance statute did not cover those
individuals injured by uninsured non-residents, hit-and-run drivers,
operators of stolen or unregistered vehicles, and drivers of registered but
somehow uninsured automobiles, the New York State legislature in 1958
enacted the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Act, to widen the
scope of protection for traffic victims or their survivors, for personal
injuries or death. The Corporation, comprising all the motor vehicle
liability insurers authorized to do business within the state, elects a
board of directors which manages the Corporation. MVAIC has author-
ity to investigate claims and to appear on behalf of the unidentified or
financially irresponsible motorist. Its liability maximum is $10,000 for
injury or death of one person and $20,000 total for injury to two or more
persons, with no provision made for property damage compensation.24
Reported cases involving the Corporation indicate it employs the
same tactics of delay, harassment, and barratry, as the individual in-
surers, in attempting to evade liability and payment.
In Fitzpatrick v. MVAIC, 25 the Corporation sought to stay plaintiff's
arbitration demand, using as grounds the 3-year negligence statute of
limitations. Citing the same court's earlier opinion in LaMarsh,26 and
the Ceccarelli27 and DeBose28 decisions, Justice Livoti held that the
claim based not upon tort, but "upon a contractual obligation": "In the
absence of a provision 'in a contract setting a time limitation for insti-
tuting arbitration proceedings, the six-year statute applies.' "29
An identical decision, on identical facts, was rendered two days later
by the Supreme Court of New York County in Guiness v. MVAIC.30
Justice Brust commented:
22 Supra, n. 19, at 592.
23 Id. at 593.
24 Bernstein, Private Dispute Settlements, at 190-1 (1969).
25 Supra, n. 15, at 154.
26 Supra, n. 18, decided June 20, 1962.
27 Supra, n. 12.
28 Supra, n. 15.
29 Supra, n. 15, at 156.
30 40 Misc. 2d 775, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 746 (Sup. Ct., New York Co., 1963), 28 A.L.R. 3d
580, decided October 3, 1963.
Sept. 1970
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The conduct of the respondent in this matter leaves grave
doubts in this court's mind as to whether this body is faithfully ful-
filling the job for which it was created.31
The over-litigated issue of tort v. contract statute of limitations in
uninsured motorist endorsements 31a at length reached the New York
Court of Appeals, in 1966, in two proceedings heard simultaneously-
DeLuca v. MVAIC and MVAIC v. Bradanese.32 In each the petitioner
had been injured in 1960, by an uninsured motorist; in each he promptly
filed a claim with MVAIC, but did not serve a demand for arbitration
until 1964. MVAIC moved to stay arbitration on grounds of the 3-year
bar. Judge Fuld, in a 4-3 decision, affirmed the lower court's denial of
the motion, commenting: "If the Statute of Limitations had been de-
sired as a restriction on an insured's claim against MVAIC, it would have
been a simple matter to expressly provide therefor--either by the insurer
in the policy or by the Legislature in the statute." 33
Chief Judge Desmond second-guessed the New York legislature
differently:
The holding that the six-year limitation is available to respond-
ent because this is an "action on a contract" . . . is correct if, forget-
ting all else, we consider only the circumstance that respondents'
right to recover from MVAIC is expressed in a rider to an insurance
policy. But the result (six years instead of three for beginning
a litigation for personal injuries) is so obviously unreasonable and
unintended that we should look at the larger picture. The whole
concept of MVAIC was a legislative creation intended to secure to
injured persons like these the same protection ... they would have
had as to their tort-feasors had their injuries been caused by insured
cars or drivers who did not hit and run .... The policy rider here
sued upon is a mere instrumentality for carrying out the legislative
mandate and so it is legislative intent we should be looking for. To
say in these days of struggle against litigation delays that the Legis-
lature for no discoverable reason gave this class of claimants three
years longer to commence suit than they would have had to sue in
the more usual situation is to ascribe to the Legislature an incredible
purpose.3 4
31 Id. at 765.
sla In addition to cases on point already cited in this paper, the following were also
litigated in New York courts: McNamara v. MVAIC, 22 A.D. 2d 1017, 254 N.Y.S. 2d
808 (1st Dept.) (1964), affg. 42 Misc. 3d 923, 248 N.Y.S. 2d 1009; MVAIC v. McDon-
nell, 23 AXD. 2d 773, 258 N.Y.S. 2d 735 (1965), affg. 40 Misc. 2d 657, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 229,
28 A.L.R. 3d 585; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Guarriello, N.Y. L. J., Mar. 14, 1963, at 15/2;
Napoli v. VAIC, N.Y. L. J., June 29, 1964, at 9/6; Massa v. MVAIC, N.Y. L. J., Nov.
4, 1964, at 17/3.
32 17 N.Y. 2d 76, 268 N.Y.S. 2d 289, 215 N.E. 2d 482, 28 A.L.R. 3d 580, 585, 586, decided
Feb. 24, 1966.
33 Id. at 293.
34 Id. at 293-4.
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Among states following New York's lead in applying the longer
statute of limitations in arbitration demands under the uninsured motor-
ist endorsement are Louisiana, 35 Tennessee,86 Florida,8 7 New Mexico, 88
and Ohio.39
The Ohio Position
Schuiz v. Allstate Ins. Co.40 represents the only case in Ohio on the
issue of applying the appropriate statute of limitations under uninsured
motorist endorsement claims. Plaintiff sustained personal injuries on
October 30, 1963, as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle
by one Allen, who was not insured. Pursuant to the terms of his policy,
after being unable to agree with the defendant on a reasonable amount
of recoverable damages, Schulz filed a demand for arbitration on March
29, 1967. Allstate refused to arbitrate, whereupon Schulz filed this action
to compel arbitration. Allstate demurred, seeking to bar the proceeding
by invoking the Ohio 2-year personal injury statute of limitations.41
Judge Leach overruled the demurrer,42 following the precedent of the
New York courts in Ceccareli,43 LaMarsh,4 4 andDeBose,4 5 commenting
(as had these cases), that if Allstate had intended to limit payment under
the clause to a period of two years from the infliction of the injury, it
would have been a simple matter to incorporate such words into the
policy. In interpreting the language of the insurance contract, the court
applied the rule of liberal construction in favor of the insured and
against the drawer of the language employed-Allstate.46 Judge Leach
35 Accord: Booth v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 197 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 2, 1967).
Contra: (action in tort) Fremin v. Collins, 194 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 4, 1967); (action
in tort but governed by prescriptive period applicable to tort actions) Thomas v.
Employers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 208 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1, 1968), writ issued 252 La.
177, 210 So. 2d 56 (1968).
36 Schlief v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 218 Tenn. 489, 404 S.W. 2d 490
(1966), 28 A.L.R. 3d 580, 587. Justice White here noted that the purpose of a shorter
statute of limitations for tort actions was to preserve the reliability of evidence. It
was inapplicable in this case since the other motorist's identity being unknown, (1)
plaintiff's only action was in contract against the defendant insurer, and, (2) the
defendant insurer had no subrogation rights which were prejudiced by the plaintiff's
failure to sue the anonymous hit-and-run driver within the one-year tort period.
37 Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Mason, 210 So. 2d 474 (Fla. App. 3, 1968).
38 Haury v. Allstate Ins. Co., 384 F. 2d 32 (C.A. 10, N.M., 1967), 28 A.L.R. 3d 580. See
discussion infra.
39 Schulz v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, n. 12. See discussion infra.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 83-5, O.R.C. § 2305.10. See supra, n. 11.
42 Id. at 90.
43 Supra, n. 12.
44 Supra, n. 15.
45 Supra, n. 18.
46 Supra, n. 12, at 90, citing 30 Ohio Jur. 2d at 225.
Sept. 1970
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noted further that a cause of action to enforce an agreement to arbitrate
could not arise until and when one party refused to arbitrate.
47
Conflict of Laws and the Statute of Limitations
Haury v. Allstate Ins. Co.48 represents the only case on the issue of
whether or not proceedings in one state (New Mexico) under the un-
insured motorist endorsement are barred by the statute of limitations of
another (California). Haury, a California resident; obtained and paid for
an automobile insurance policy containing uninsured motorist liability
coverage. He and co-plaintiff Kelly, a passenger in his car, were injured
in an accident in New Mexico, when their car collided with one driven
by an uninsured motorist.
Haury then made demand for arbitration-but more than one year
after the collision. Allstate raised the one-year California statute of lim-
itations, in defense. By mutual consent, the arbitration proceeding was
transferred to a state court in New Mexico, from whence it was removed
to the federal court, on the ground of diversity. Plaintiff sought a de-
claratory judgment that the arbitration was not barred by the California
statute.49
The United States District Court of New Mexico granted summary
judgment for Allstate. This was reversed on appeal. Since Allstate does
business in New Mexico and is subject to suit there, reasoned Judge
Breitenbaugh, the state may impose its own rules on it. The court felt
that the interest of the state in insurance protection for individuals in-
jured upon its soil constituted sufficient contact to sustain its jurisdiction.
In diversity cases it is established that federal courts apply the rules of
the state in which they sit, when deciding questions of conflict of laws-
except if the foreign statute is part of the foreign substantive law. Since
the California statute was procedural rather than substantive, it was held
not applicable.50
Statutory Limitations
California is the only state whose uninsured motorist liability statute
provides for an express period within which action must be taken by the
insured on a personal injury claim. In the interim of one year from the
date of an accident involving an uninsured motorist, the injured party
47 Supra, n. 12, at 90.
48 Supra, n. 38.
49 West's Annotated Calif. Codes, § 1158.2 "(h): LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS. No
cause of action shall accrue to the insured under any policy or endorsement provision
issued pursuant to this section unless within one year from the date of this accident:
... (3) . . . has formally instituted arbitration proceedings."
50 Supra, n. 38, at 34.
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must make a formal demand for arbitration, settle with the insurer, or
institute suit against the tortfeasor.51
In Bell v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 52 appellant had been injured in
a collision with one Muehlmann, uninsured, on November 5, 1960. Her
attorney began negotiations by letter with respondent within one year
thereof, for damages for personal injuries. Unable to consummate an
agreement, on August 18, 1961, he filed a demand for arbitration. On
December 13, 1961, he filed an action in municipal court for property
damage and personal injury against Muehlmann, who suffered a defaultjudgment and damages of $1500 to be entered against him on December
28, 1961. The arbitration action was heard on March 23, 1962. Respond-
ent's defenses were (1) that appellant was contributorily negligent, and(2) that her claim under the uninsured motorist endorsement of the pol-
icy was barred because the statute of limitations had run against her on
the claim against Muehlmann and thus against respondent, also.
On April 10, 1962, the arbitrator awarded the appellant $1500. On
May 15, 1962, respondent company filed a petition to vacate the arbitra-
tion award, raising the statute of limitations bar in the appellant's claim
against Muehlmann. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County set aside
the arbitration award. Judge Lillie of the Second District Court of Ap-
peals reversed in favor of the appellant, holding that she had complied
with the terms of the insurance contract by instituting a formal demand
for arbitration within a year of the accident; and that her failure to sue
Muehlmann within the same period in no way prejudiced the rights of
the company. In failing to defend his action, Muehlmann was deemed to
have waived a valid defense of the bar of the statute.53
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Merced
County54 was an original mandamus proceeding to compel the respondent
to vacate its order directing arbitration, in an action by the guardian ad
litem of the real party in interest, a minor, who on the date of the acci-
dent, July 16, 1963, was 12 years old. While riding a bicycle, she collided
with an automobile operated by one Refugio Lopez, uninsured. Under
the policy issued by State Farm Mutual to her father, she was an addi-
tional insured. However, his action in her behalf-a demand for arbi-
tration-was not filed until 15 months after the accident. The company
was at length compelled to arbitrate by the Merced County Superior
Court. On appeal, the sole issue was whether or not a minor had to com-
ply with the one-year limitation designated by statute.55 Citing the rule
51 Supra, n. 49.
52 213 Cal. App. 2d 541, 29 Cal. Rptr. 67 (C.A. 2, 1963), 28 A.L.R. 3d 580, 587.
53 Id. at 69-71.
54 232 Cal. App. 2d 808, 43 Cal. Rptr. 209 (C.A. 5, 1965), 28 A.L.R. 3d 580, 590.
55 Supra, n. 49.
Sept. 1970
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established in a California Supreme Court case, 56 Justice Stone held that
the disability of minority57 was not applicable, and he issued the writ.58
In Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cole,59 Justice Stone declared it reason-
able to apply prospectively the one-year period of limitations amend-
ment6 ° to the uninsured motorist statute, although it had not been en-
acted when the accident occurred, to bar a demand for arbitration one
year from the effective date of the amendment.6 ' The court noted, how-
ever, that the amendment shortening the period of limitations could not
be applied retroactively to wipe out an accrued cause of action that was
not barred by the then applicable statute of limitations.6 2
On the authority of Niagara3 and State Farm Mutual,6 4 Pacific In-
demnity Co. v. Superior Court of San Francisco County6 5 held that the
one-year period of limitations, although enacted after the issuance of the
policy and the occurrence of the accident, could also be constitutionally
applied prospectively to bar the right of the real party in interest-an
injured minor-to arbitrate, where more than one year had elapsed be-
tween the effective date of the statute and the filing date of the demand.
Accordingly, Justice Sullivan issued a peremptory writ of mandate, or-
dering the lower court to enjoin the arbitration proceedings.66
In Calhoun v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,67 the widow of the
insured sought declaratory relief against his insurer. The accident had
56 Artukovich v. Artukovich, 21 Cal. 2d 329, 131 P. 2d 831, at 834 stated: "there are
statutory provisions extending special consideration to minors with respect to the
time within which certain proceedings must be commenced (Code Civ. Proc. § 328,
352, 1272; Prob. Code § 384, 931), but the special consideration extended is expressly
limited to the proceedings therein mentioned."
57 West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. § 352, 1281.2.
58 Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Superior Ct. of San Francisco Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 63, 54
Cal. Rptr. 470 (C.A. 1, 1966), 28 A.L.R. 3d, 580, 589; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Orlando, 262
Cal. App. 2d 858, 69 Cal. Rptr. 702 (C.A. 2, 1966), 28 A.L.R. 580, 590; and Republic
Indemnity Co. of America v. Barn Furniture Mart, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 517, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 609 (C.A. 2, 1967), 28 A.L.R. 3d 580, 590, citing the instant case as authority,
declared that the statutory time limitation provision under uninsured motorist cover-
age for filing a claim was not extended in the case of injured minors.
59 235 Cal. App. 2d 40, 44 Cal. Rptr. 839 (C.A. 5, 1965), 28 A.L.R. 3d 580, 588.
60 Supra, n. 49.
61 The accident occurred on April 4, 1960. Appellant filed an accident report within
30 days, but did not make a claim for damages for bodily injury and demand for
arbitration upon respondent until July 17, 1963. Effective Sept. 15, 191, subdivision
(h) was added to § 11580.2.
62 Supra, n. 59, at 890-1.
63 Id.
64 Supra, n. 54.
65 Supra, n. 58, at 471 et seq. Key Insurance Exchange v. Biagini, 250 Cal. App. 2d
143, 58 Cal. Rptr. 408 (C.A. 1, 1967), 28 A.L.R. 3d 580, 589, also applied Ins. Code
§ 11580.2 subd. (h) prospectively, even though the policy was issued prior to its en-
actment, where the insured initiated arbitration proceedings more than 2 years after
the accident.
66 Supra, n. 58, at 476.
67 254 Cal. App. 2d 407, 62 Cal. Rptr. 177 (CA. 1, 1967), 28 A.L.R. 3d 580, 591-2.
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occurred in New Mexico, on April 29, 1963. The driver of the other auto-
mobile, one Bach, was insured only up to $5,000 for the death of one per-
son. In July, 1963, defendant's representative informed Mrs. Calhoun
that Bach was not an uninsured motorist and that his company denied
coverage.
Taylor v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co. s had earlier held that an
"uninsured motor vehicle under section 11580.2 is one carrying insur-
ance with limits of less than the financial responsibility requirement of
the Vehicle Code." 0 9 On March 20, 1964, Mrs. Calhoun's attorney made
formal demand by letter on State Farm Mutual for damages for wrong-
ful death, in the amount of $5,000, which represented the difference be-
tween Bach's coverage and Calhoun's. Not receiving any reply, on April
20, 1964, he filed suit. Justice Agee upheld the trial court's judgment and
rationale that the demand letter and the filing of the suit within one year
of the accident not only satisfied, but tolled, the statute of limitations.7"
In Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Diskin,71 the automobile liability insurer
sought declaratory relief and a permanent injunction against arbitration
proceedings instituted by the insureds-husband and wife-who were
injured in March, 1962, in Miami Beach, Florida, when the taxi in which
they were passengers collided with a fire hydrant. The operator was cov-
ered by insurance issued by a company which became insolvent in May,
1963. Although the Florida statute of limitations for personal injuries is
4 years, the Diskins made no attempt to recover damages from the tort-
feasor. Instead, in March, 1964, they instituted the arbitration proceed-
ings in question against their own insurer, in Los Angeles, to obtain
damages under the uninsured motorist clause. The appellate court ruled
that a motorist whose insurer becomes insolvent after the collision qual-
ifies as an uninsured motorist.72 It affirmed the trial court's judgment,
barring recovery under the endorsement. By failing to file suit within
one year against the wrongdoer, the defendants were held to have failed
to acquire a claim against their own insurer under the California code,
despite the fact that they did not have an actionable claim against their
own insurer until the insurer of the other motorist became insolvent-
more than one year after the accident.
73
The court's rationale was that if the statute were construed to allow
the filing of actions within a year following the insurer's solvency, the
insured would be initiating a claim when suit against the original tort-
68 225 Cal. App. 2d 80, 37 Cal. Rptr. 63 (C.A. 1, 1964).
69 Sup'ra, n. 67, at 178 et seq.
70 Id. at 182.
71 255 Cal. App. 2d 502, 63 Cal. Rptr. 177 (C.A. 2, 1968), 28 A.L.R. 3d 580, 587, 591.
72 Id. at 179.
73 Supra, n. 49 and West's Annot. Code Civ. Pro. § 340.
Sept. 1970
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1970
AUTO ARBITRATION LIMITATIONS
feasor was barred. Thus the insurer's right of subrogation against the
wrongdoer would be nullified. Interpreting the language of the statute,
the court thought the legislature intended a result in which the un-
insured motorist liability attached to the original tortfeasor "as closely as
possible." 74 The correct procedure under California law, according to
Justice Fleming, is for the injured insured to protect his contingent claim
against his own insurer by filing suit against the other motorist during
the one-year period or by instituting arbitration proceedings against his
own insurer within one year if the tortfeasor is uninsured. 75
As to the Diskins' claim that the longer Florida statute of limitations
should control, Justice Fleming ruled:
Since appellants claim pursuant to a California right in a Cali-
fornia court, both substantively and procedurally, they are bound by
California law.... Not only are conditions of right governed by the
statute which creates the right,... but in accordance with the usual
conflict of law rule, periods of limitations are matters of procedure
controlled by the law of the forum state.
76
Solution to the Tort-Contract Statute of Limitations Controversy
As already noted in this paper, those courts which have upheld the
longer contract statute of limitations have consistently commented that
insurers could have easily solved the dilemma by expressly limiting any
payment under the uninsured motorist clauses to their own policyholders
upon claims filed within a specified period of time.77 Since the insurance
companies drafted the clauses found within their policies, omissions or
ambiguities must be liberally construed against them.
78
The alternative is for state legislatures to amend their uninsured
motorist coverage statutes to include specific-but reasonable-time pe-
riods within which claims by the injured must be filed as a condition
precedent to payment, or be barred from recovery. California is the bell-
wether of this kind of reform, as we have shown. Construction and inter-
pretation of the statute of limitations statutes in multi-issue causes would
remain the domain of the courts.
79
Until this problem is solved, to avoid the statute of limitations pitfall,
attorneys for the insured should file an action against the tortfeasor if
settlement with his insurer does not appear likely within a year after the
accident. Where the uninsured motorist is known and apparently solvent,
74 Supra, n. 71, at 184.
75 Id. at 182.
76 Id. at 183.
77 See DeBose, supra, n. 15, at 20; Fitzpatrick, supra, n. 18, at 156; DeLuca, supra,
n. 32, at 293; Schulz, supra, n. 12, at 90.
78 Id. (at 90).
79 Cf. discussion of Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Diskin, supra; citation at n. 71.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol19/iss3/14
19 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3)
the insurer should file an action within a year-if his insured has not-
to preserve its subrogation right.
Conclusion
To alleviate the hardships of uncompensated personal injury wrought
by the negligence of uninsured judgment-proof operators of motor vehi-
cles, most states have provided for some type of compulsory uninsured
motorist coverage in personal automobile liability policies, which provide
for recovery by the insured from his own insurer in the event of a col-
lision with a financially irresponsible driver.
Except in California, these uninsured motorist statutes do not pro-
vide for any specified period within which the injured must file his claim
for damages. The uninsured motorist coverage clauses in policies have
likewise been silent on the subject.
A controversy has arisen as to whether the (usually) shorter negli-
gence (tort) statute of limitations or the longer contract time limit gov-
erns. Insurers have favored the former and have often resorted to all
manner of delay tactics to prevent their policyholders from recovery and
have then raised the statute of limitations as a bar to payments where
the issue has arisen. In the wake of such conduct, courts of New York,
Ohio, Virginia, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Louisiana, have appropriate-
ly construed the time-period-within-which-to-file-claims omission in un-
insured motorist coverage clauses against the drawers-the insurers-and
have applied the more liberal contract statute of limitations. Their ra-
tionale has been that the action is ex-contractu against the insurer and
not ex delicto against the tortfeasor. Insurance companies maintain this
destroys their right of subrogation because the statute of limitations has
run on the tort claim. The courts, however, have found little merit in
this contention, since under the trust agreement of the policy, the insurer
may compel his insured to sue the tortfeasor. If they fail to enforce this
provision, the insurance companies alone have destroyed their subroga-
tion rights.8 0
The controversy can be readily resolved: either the insurers should
express a specific time period in their uninsured motorist endorsements
within which their injured insureds must file their complaints; or state
legislatures should amend their uninsured motorist coverage statutes to
contain such express provision, as a condition precedent to recovery of
damages.
In Ohio under the present law, one injured through the negligence
of an uninsured motorist has 15 years within which to bring action for
damages against his own insurer, under his policy.8 '
80 Comment, 48 Calif. L. R. 532, supra, n. 12; Notes, 14 Fla. L. R. 472, supra, n. 12.
81 Supra, n. 11.
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